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R. at 221-23. (The Memorandum Decision is attached at Addendum "A".) On August 8,
2002, the district court entered an Order Granting Defendants' Renewed Motion to
Dismiss Franchisees' suit.

R. at 224-26. Franchisees filed a Notice of Appeal on

September 4, 2002. R. at 227.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Franchisor sets forth below a statement of the facts relevant to the issue presented
to this Court for review. As directed by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Franchisor has supported each averment with a citation to the record.
A.

The Forum-Selection Clause.

On June 5, 1997, the individual Franchisees and Juice Works entered into the
Juice Works Franchise Agreement that is the subject of the Complaint (the "Franchise
Agreement"). R. at 3, 47, & 90. Paragraph 17 of the Franchise Agreement contains a
forum-selection clause that carefully limits the number of forums in which Juice Works,
or its successors, may be compelled to bring or defend an action:
F.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

FRANCHISEE and the COMPANY agree that any action arising out
of or relating to this Agreement (including, without limitation, the offer and
sale of the franchise rights) shall be instituted and maintained only in a state
or federal court of general jurisdiction in Pulaski County, Arkansas, and
FRANCHISEE irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of such court and

2

Franchisees have not only ignored this dictate, they have cited as "fact" material never
made part of the proceedings in the district court. See material at Addendum E of the
Brief of Appellants ("Aplt's Br"). Under these circumstances, this Court should reject
Franchisees' appeal. See Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

waives any objection FRANCHISEE may have either to the jurisdiction or
venue of such court.
G.

BINDING EFFECT

This Agreement is binding upon the parties hereto and their
respective executors, administrators, heirs, assigns, and successors in
interest, and shall not be modified except by written agreement signed by
both FRANCHISEE and the COMPANY.
R. at 88.
Following the execution of the Franchise Agreement, Franchisees established a
Juice Works franchise store in the ZCMI Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. at 2-3.
HASCO LLC (which Franchisees also refer to as HASCO Synergetics, LLC) "is a Utah
limited liability company through which the individual plaintiffs-the franchiseesconducted their" Juice Works business. R. at 2.
B.

The Nexus Between Arkansas and the Matter at Hand.

At the time the parties entered into the Franchise Agreement, both Juice Works
and TCBY Systems, Inc. were Arkansas corporations. R. at 2 & 43. TCBY Systems,
Inc. merged into TCBY Systems, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, on June 1,
2000. R. at 43. Juice Works, a wholly-owned subsidiary of TCBY Systems, LLC,
remains an Arkansas corporation. Id.
Furthermore, several of the witnesses in this case currently reside in Arkansas.
For example, Alton Files, former Vice President of Development for TCBY Systems,
Inc., and Jim Sahene, former COO for TCBY Systems, Inc., both reside in Arkansas, and
may be called to testify regarding the sale of the Franchisees' franchise and sales of Juice
Works franchises generally.

R. at 210.

Additionally, non-party witnesses such as

Arkansas resident Phil Glover, manager of Riverport Equipment Company, which
supplies equipment to Juice Works franchisees, may be called to testify regarding this
equipment.

Id.

Likewise, Arkansas resident Jim Fink, former Vice President of

Americana Foods Limited Partnership, which produced Juice Works and TCBY products
during the time Franchisees operated their franchise, may be called to testify. R. at 211.
C.

Franchisees Have the Resources to Litigate in Arkansas.

Scott and Judith Haslam are husband and wife. R. at 187. Mr. Haslam has a
degree in pharmacy, is a licensed pharmacist, and the proprietor of Winegar's Pharmacy.
R. at 187. Ms. Haslam has a degree in education and is a homemaker. Id. Together,
they opened the pharmacy in 1989. Id. For 1998, 1999, and 2000, the Haslams' joint tax
return showed:

(1) gross pharmacy sales of just over $800,000, $888,000 and

$1,000,000, respectively; (2) gross pharmacy profits of $140,000, $128,000 and
$134,000, respectively; and (3) total income of $72,000, $62,000 and $63,000,
respectively. R. at 188. In addition, at the time of their depositions, the Haslams had a
personal checking account with $2,000; a business checking account with $30,000;
retirement accounts worth roughly $90,000; a 3,600 square foot home in Kaysville, Utah
worth approximately $300,000; and three automobiles. R. at 188. And apart from their
home mortgage ($220,000) and automobile loan ($6,000), the Haslams had no debt. Id.
Anthony Coombs is Mr. and Ms. Haslams' son-in-law. R. at 187. Mr. Coombs
has a degree in consumer economics and is employed by NAI Utah Commercial as a real
estate agent. R. at 188. At the time of his deposition, he had approximately $7,000,000
worth of property under contract and four closings worth approximately $5,500,000 set

for the next three months. Mr. Coombs expected gross commissions from those four
closings to total approximately $50,000. Id. In 2001 Mr. Coombs earned approximately
$49,000, comprised of $19,600 from his employment, $22,000 (paid in advance) from
renting out his home during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, and $7,400 from the sale
of a house. R. at 188. Also at the time of his deposition, Mr. Coombs and his wife had
two checking accounts with balances totaling $1,600; a 1,920 square foot home in
Centerville, Utah worth approximately $233,000; a money market fund with $12,000;
and a 1998 Honda Passport. R. at 188. The Coombs' personal debt consisted of their
home mortgage loan ($210,000), an automobile loan ($13,000) and school loans
($7,000). R. at 188-89. Mr. Coombs drives a Volvo S40, which he leases. R. at 189.
Franchisees have made no effort whatsoever to locate or hire an attorney in
Arkansas. R. at 189.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Franchisees' argument on appeal, like their argument below, consists of little more
than citations to Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), a case that addressed
whether, in light of due process considerations, personal jurisdiction could be exercised
over a defendant franchisee in a jurisdiction where he did not operate his business on the
basis of a franchising agreement. (The answer, incidentally, was "Yes." Id. at 487.) The
personal jurisdiction analysis conducted in Burger King, however, is completely
inapposite to the improper venue issue presented in this appeal. Mr. Coombs, Mr.
Haslam, Ms. Haslam, and HASCO LLC are plaintiffs, not defendants, and, as plaintiffs,
they made a deliberate decision to initiate the present litigation. Nobody haled them into

court against their will, either here or anywhere else. As a consequence, this appeal does
not implicate any question of personal jurisdiction.
What this appeal does implicate, however, is, as noted above, the question of
whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined that Franchisees failed
to meet their burden of demonstrating that litigating this matter in Arkansas, the
contractually designated forum, would be unjust?

And in light of the fact that

Franchisees offered (1) no evidence that they would be deprived of their day in court if
they were required to refile the action in Arkansas, and (2) no real explanation as to why
Defendants should be denied the benefit of their bargain, the answer is a resounding
"No".
ARGUMENT
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Franchisees' Complaint
for improper venue. This Court should therefore affirm the order of the district court and
require Franchisees to refile this action in Arkansas, if at all.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ANALYZED WHETHER THE
FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE, DESIGNATING ARKANSAS AS THE
PROPER FORUM FOR DISPUTES REGARDING THE FRANCHISE
AGREEMENT, SHOULD BE HONORED.
Franchisees invite this Court to error by supplanting the standard adopted by the

Utah Supreme Court for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses (the standard
employed by the district court) with the standard governing the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Aplt's Br. at 8-17. Because there is no basis in American jurisprudence for
Franchisees' position, this Court should decline their request.

A.

As a Matter of Contract, Franchisees' Claims Are Subject to the
Forum-Selection Clause Set Forth in the Franchise Agreement.

The forum-selection clause at issue governs not only actions "arising out of or
relating to" the Franchise Agreement, but, without limitation, actions arising out of "the
offer and sale of the franchise rights." R. at 88. Franchisees' claims for breach of
contract, fraud, concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence all arise out of
alleged misrepresentations in the offer and sale of the Juice Works franchise or alleged
failures to perform under the Franchise Agreement. R. at 1-9. This entire action is
therefore subject to the forum-selection clause.
B.

The Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses Is in Keeping with WeilEstablished Utah Supreme Court Precedent.

A forum-selection clause such as that contained in the Franchise Agreement
between the parties here, is, without question, enforceable. In Prows, 868 P.2d 809, our
Supreme Court surveyed the law applicable to the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses and clearly articulated the standard governing their enforceability:
The modem view adopted by a majority of courts and which we
adopt today is set forth in section 80 of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws:
The parties' agreement as to the place of the action will be
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 80 (Supp. 1988). Under this
section, a plaintiff who brings an action in violation of a choice-of-forum
provision bears the burden of proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or
unreasonable. Id. § 80 cmt. c.
To meet this burden a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 'chosen
state would be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to require the
plaintiff to bring suit there would be unjust.' Id. On this point, the United

States Supreme Court stated, 4[I]t should be incumbent on the party
seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the contractual
forum will be [so] gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all
practice purposes be deprived of his day in court'
809 P.2d at 812 (quoting M/S Breman v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972))
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Indeed, the judicial preference for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is
widespread and strong. For example, in Riley v. Kingsly Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,
969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that forum-selection clauses are "prima facie
valid" and that a party resisting enforcement carries a heavy burden of showing that the
provision itself is invalid due to fraud or that enforcement would be unjust under the
circumstances. The Tenth Circuit further held that mere inconvenience to plaintiffs is
insufficient to overcome a forum selection clause:
Only a showing of inconvenience so serious as to foreclose a remedy,
perhaps coupled with a showing of bad faith, overreaching or lack of
notice, would be sufficient to defeat a contractual forum selection clause.
969 F.2d at 958 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Zions First Nat. Bank, 688 F.Supp. at
1499 (Winder, J.) (holding that "defendants must show that a trial in Utah would be so
gravely difficult and inconvenient that the defendants for all practical purposes will be
deprived of their day in court"); Nelms v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 808 S.W.2d 314
(Ark. 1991).
In place of the Prows test, Franchisees argue for the wholesale importation of
principles of personal jurisdiction:

The correct test of venue, in the face of an un-bargained for forum
selection clause, is 'fair play and substantial justice' otherwise stated as due
process 'fundamental fairness.'
Aplt's Br. at 11. But neither the parties to this action nor this Court have the luxury of
being able to reject a standard set by the Utah Supreme Court without committing
reversible error. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994), cert denied,
513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Consequently, Prows, 868 P.2d 809, governs this dispute.
II.

BECAUSE FRANCHISEES FAILED TO SHOW THAT TRYING THIS
MATTER IN ARKANSAS WOULD DEPRIVE THEM OF THEIR DAY IN
COURT, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REQUIRING THEM TO HONOR THE FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE,
The only question remaining is whether Plaintiffs established that enforcing the

forum-selection clause to which they agreed would be unfair or unreasonable. Under
Prows this inquiry essentially folds into an analysis of whether the district court abused
its discretion when it found that Franchisees failed to meet their burden of showing that
trying this matter in Arkansas would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that they
would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of their day in court.
To this end, Franchisees argue that denying them "their day in Utah Court" would
be unjust. Aplt's Br. at 15. But Franchisees offered no meaningful evidence to show that
they would be deprived of their day in court if they were required to refile in Arkansas.
Franchisees never even attempted to contact an attorney in Arkansas in an effort to find
representation on a contingency basis. Supra at 6. Nor did they suggest that that their
present counsel could not (or would not) continue to perform all substantive legal work
by appearing pro hac vice in Arkansas. And given that Franchisees allege that they have

a meritorious claim against Franchisor for not less than $4,000,000 (R. at 9), it is hard to
imagine that they would have had any difficulty locating an attorney, either here or in
Arkansas, willing to bear the entire cost of litigation.
The reality is that there is no factual basis in the record for concluding that
Franchisees met the burden placed upon them by the Prows decision.3

Franchisees

clearly are not impecunious and requiring them to honor their contractual commitment
would not deprive them of their day in court. On the contrary, discovery demonstrated
that Franchisees possess more than sufficient financial resources to proceed with
litigation in Arkansas. In 1998, 1999, and 2000, the Haslams' had taxable income of
$72,000, $62,000 and $63,000, respectively. Supra at 5-6. They live in a $300,000
house, own three automobiles, and have retirement accounts worth approximately
$90,000. Id. Likewise, Mr. Coombs enjoys a very comfortable lifestyle, living in a
$233,000 house, driving two new automobiles and earning healthy commissions from his

3

In a footnote in Prows, the Utah Supreme Court noted that:
A party might also show that (1) the choice-of-forum provision was
'obtained by fraud, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means'; or (2) the courts of the chosen state 'would be
closed to the suit or would not handle it effectively or fairly.' Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 cmt. c (Supp. 1988).

Prows, 868 P.2d at 812 n.5. These alternative showings, however, are of no use to
Franchisees. First, Franchisees make only the most superficial of allegations of disparate
bargaining power. Aplt's Br. at 11-12. And a "bald assertion of inequality in bargaining
power is an insufficient basis on which to find a contract provision unenforceable."
Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra at 1315. Second, they make no claim that Arkansas courts would be closed to their suit.

real estate business. Id. Neither the Haslams nor the Coombs have any real debt. Id.
Franchisees' individual and collective financial state is clearly healthy.
Under these circumstances, it would have been an abuse of discretion had the
district court denied Franchisor's motion to dismiss for improper venue. See Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a forum-selection despite
increased cost to individual plaintiffs); Kukje Hwajae Insurance Co., Ltd. v. The M/V
Hyundai Liberty, et al, 29A F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2002).
III.

FRANCHISOR IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FORUMSELECTION CLAUSE IN THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT.
A simple but fundamental part of the formula for business success is

predictability. A forum-selection clause that limits the jurisdictions in which a business
can be haled into court is an integral part of this formula.

See Carnival Cruise Lines,

Inc., 499 U.S. at 593-94; Riley, 969 F.2d 957 (explaining that "such a provision obviates
the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum . . .
unfamiliar with the problem area involved").
This need for predictability is particularly important to businesses, like the
franchise business, that operate in multiple states and multiple countries. As the United
States Supreme Court noted in its Carnival Cruise Lines decision:
Including a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of this kind [nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket contract] well may be
permissible for several reasons: First, a cruise line has a special interest in
limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit. . . .
Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution
has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits arising
from the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time
and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and

conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding
those motions. . . . Finally it stands to reason that passengers who purchase
tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the
form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys
by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 593-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf.
Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.3d 372, 377 (7 Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) (holding forum-selection clause enforceable and noting that "[f]orm contracts
.. . enable enormous savings in transaction costs").
As the individuals in Carnival Cruise Lines received the benefit of reduced fares
attendant to the cruise line limiting the fora in which it could be sued, Franchisees
received the benefit of reduced franchise fees attendant to Franchisor limiting the fora in
which it could be sued. Contrary to the position that Franchisees urge upon this Court,
however, the benefits of the bargain should flow in both directions. See Medical Legal
Consulting Service v. Covarrubias, 648 F.Supp. 153, 155 (D. Md. 1986) ("plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of its bargain which includes the forum selection clause and which
enables plaintiff to avoid litigation all over the country").
Franchisees' refrain is they should be allowed to disregard the forum-selection
clause, thereby depriving Franchisor of the benefit of the bargain, because the parties did
not specifically negotiate the forum language. Aplt's Br. at 9-10. They also argue that
they "did not know at the time of signing" that the Franchise Agreement "limited them to
presenting their claims only in Arkansas because "they did not review the document in

any significant detail." Id4 In other words, Franchisees contend that they should not be
bound by the Franchise Agreement because they did not bother to read it. Both positions
lack merit. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. 585 (enforcing a forum-selection
clause that was included among three pages of terms attached to a cruise ship ticket).
M.B. Restaurants, Inc. v. CKE Restaurants, Inc., 183 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1999), is
truly on-point. In M.B. Restaurants, Inc., as here, plaintiff-franchisees filed suit in their
home state (South Dakota) "alleging breach of contract and various torts." Id. at 751. In
M.B. Restaurants, Inc., as here, the "franchise agreement contained a forum clause
providing that any litigation be conducted" in another state (Utah) and "the district court
dismissed . . . [the] action for improper venue." Id. In M.B. Restaurants, Inc., as here,
"[sjometime after the franchise agreements were entered into," the original franchisor
(JB's Restaurant, "headquartered in Salt Lake City") was acquired by another entity,
headquartered in another state. Id. at 750-52.6 And in M.B. Restaurants, Inc., as here,
the franchisees argued on appeal that "enforcement of the forum selection clause deprives
them of their fair day in court . . . [and] focus on the disparity of bargaining power

4

Additionally, Franchisees neglect to provide any record support for these statements.

5

Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256 (Utah 2000) (Aplt's
Br. at 13-14), is of no assistance to Franchisees. That case, like M/S Breman, 407 U.S. 1,
deals with issues of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, to the extent it requires a rational
nexus between the forum identified in the selection clause and either the relevant parties
or the relevant transactions, that nexus is easily established here. See supra at 4-5; see
also M.B. Restaurants, Inc. v. CKE Restaurants, Inc., 183 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1999).
6

The case caption indicates that the acquiring corporation, CKE Restaurants, Inc. is a
California corporation. M.B. Restaurants, Inc., 183 F.3d at 750. A search of public
records reveals that it is headquartered in California as well.

between their group" and franchisor, the lack of negotiation of specific provisions in the
contract, [and] the expense . . . to litigate" in the foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 752.
The Eighth Circuit made short work of plaintiff-franchisees' contentions. To
begin with, the court held that the "fact that the contract was a form contract and that the
individual clauses were not actually negotiated does not render the clause per se
unenforceable." M.B. Restaurants, Inc., 183 F.3d at 752 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). The court then held that "inconvenience to a party is an insufficient basis to
defeat an otherwise enforceable forum selection clause." Id. (citation omitted). And
finally the court held that plaintiff-franchisees' allegations were "insufficient to overcome
the presumption of validity, and [that] the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the case." Id. There is no reason this Court should reach a different result.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental issue in this case is, as the district court concluded, whether
Franchisees failed to meet their burden of establishing that litigating this matter in
Arkansas, the venue designated by the forum-selection clause, would deny them their day
in court.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that

Franchisees failed to carry their burden. This Court should therefore affirm the order of
the district court dismissing Franchisees' Complaint for improper venue.
DATED this JJZ1_ day of February, 2003.
By AsS/}^d:
../»v/'^t
Deno G. Himon'as
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
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ADDENDUM "A"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANTHONY H. COOMBS, an
individual, SCOTT HASLAM, an
individual, JUDITH M. HASLAM,
an individual, and HASCO LLC, a
Utah limited liability company.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010902619
vs.
Hon. MICHAEL K. BURTON
JUICE WORKS DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
an Arkansas corporation, TCBY
SYSTEMS, INC., an Arkansas
corporation, MRS. FILEDS'
ORIGINAL COOKIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation, MRS.
FIELDS, INC., MRS. FIELDS
BRAND, INC., MRS. FIELDS
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., and MRS.
FIELDS FAMOUS BRANDS,

Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
July 2, 2002

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
defendants' "Renewed Motion to Dismiss/7 filed on May 13, 2002. On
June 11, 2002, plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss." Also on June
11, 2002, defendants filed their "Reply Memorandum in Support of
Renewed Motion to Dismiss7' and submitted the matter for decision.
Oral argument has not been requested.
After reviewing the record in this matter and allowing counsel
time to conduct limited discovery as to the impact of the parties
litigating in Arkansas, the Court is not persuaded plaintiffs have
carried their burden to establish that a trial in Arkansas "would
be so gravely inconvenient that [plaintiffs] for all practical'
purposes will be deprived of their day in court." Zions First NatBank v. Allen, 688 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (D. Utah 1988).
Accordingly, defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Defendants are asked to prepare the appropriate order and

submit the same for signature by the Court.
DATED this

/- day of July, 2002.
BY THE COURT

MICHAEL K. BURTON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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